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Abstract
There is considerable and widespread concern about whether CEOs are appropri-
ately punished for poor performance. The empirical literature on CEO turnover
documents that CEOs are indeed more likely to be forced out if their performance
is poor relative to the industry average. However, CEOs are also more likely to be
replaced if the industry is doing badly. We show that these empirical patterns are
natural and efficient outcomes of a competitive assignment model in which CEOs
and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics, and where industry con-
ditions affect the outside options of both managers and firms. Our model also has
several new predictions about the type of replacement manager, and their pay and
performance. We construct a dataset which describes all turnover events during
the period 1992-2006 and show that these predictions are also born out empirically.
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1 Introduction
There is considerable controversy about both CEO retention, and about CEO pay. In
particular, there is concern about whether CEOs are appropriately punished for poor
performance. The empirical literature on CEO turnover documents that CEOs are indeed
more likely to be forced out of their job if their performance is poor relative to the
industry average.1 However, the empirical evidence also shows that CEOs are less likely
to be retained if overall industry performance is poor, even after accounting for the effect
of relative performance.2 Conversely, they are more likely to be retained even conditional
on poor relative performance if the industry is doing well. Jenter and Kanaan (2006)
show that this result is puzzling from the perspective of the theoretical literature on
relative performance evaluation. These models suggest that exogenous, industry, shocks
should be filtered out of the termination decision.3
We propose an explanation for the effects of industry shocks on CEO turnover which
is based on the simple idea that industry conditions affect the outside options of both
the manager and the firm.4 CEO-firm matches are dissolved when match surplus is
negative. Thus, if industry conditions affect outside options, such conditions naturally
drive turnover events. In our model, firm specific skills can act as a fixed cost which deters
turnover.5 As a result only the worst managers will be fired. Thus, our model generates
turnover which is driven both by relative, and by absolute, performance, consistent with
the empirical evidence. In the model the efficient amount of turnover occurs, even though
the fixed cost of losing firm specific capital prevents some depreciated matches from
dissolving. This implies that some managers with inappropriate skill sets, and thus
potentially inappropriate strategies, will be efficiently retained. These firm specific skills
also imply that it may be inefficient to fire poorly performing managers, especially if new
general skills are not required.
Specifically, we develop a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms
1See for example Barro and Barro (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), and Warner, Watts, and
Wruck (1988).
2See Jenter and Kanaan (2006) and Kaplan and Minton (2006).
3See Holmstrom (1982) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) for the development of the theory of relative
performance evaluation.
4See Lazear and Oyer (2004) and Oyer (2004) for empirical evidence that firms set wages in accordance
with the employees’ outside option.
5See Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) for a model of the effect of firm
specific skill on managerial turnover. See Frydman (2005) for evidence that turnover has increased over
time because general skills have become more important.
1
form matches based on multiple characteristics. CEOs are viewed as hedonic goods with
multidimensional skill bundles. Likewise, firms’ production functions have heterogeneous
weights on CEO skills such as firm-specific knowledge, ability to grow sales, and ability to
cut costs. Firm productivity is determined by the match between the firm’s skill demands
and the supply of the skills of their particular manager. There exists a competitive market
for CEOs, whose wages are determined analogously to the prices of the hedonic goods in
Rosen (1974). We also extend the standard competitive assignment model to include two
industries so that both CEOs’ and firms’ outside options are determined endogenously.
Industry shocks are modeled as shocks to firms’ skill demands. When such shocks
arrive, the quality of firm-CEO matches in that industry deteriorates. As a result, indus-
try level productivity declines. Moreover, the shock implies that firms demand managers
with different skills and this drives managerial turnover. The new equilibrium allocation
of managers across firms and industries is determined via competitive assignment, and
this equilibrium also pins down the new wage and profit allocations.
Our model has new predictions about the type of replacement manager, and their pay
and performance which we show are also born out empirically. We construct a dataset
which describes all turnover events during the period 1992-2006. We document the type
of turnover event (force outs, retirements, and potential quits), pay of the incumbent
and replacement, and whether the replacement is an industry insider or outsider. Our
model predicts that when an industry shock to firm skill weights arrives, industry output
will decline and firms with the poorest performance will fire their managers. It also
predicts that these managers will be replaced with industry outsiders, or managers with
the industry’s new skill requirements and we document this in our data. These outsider
replacements will be more highly paid both than the incumbent, and than industry
insiders and this is also true empirically. Finally, in the model and in the data, firm
performance improves under these highly paid outsider replacements.
Our paper is closely related to recent papers on CEO pay by Tervio (2008) and
Gabaix and Landier (2008). These papers show that the observed high levels of CEO
pay can be seen as natural outcomes of the joint distribution of talent and firm sizes
in a competitive assignment framework.6 These papers constitute one response to the
6For early contributions, see Lucas (1978), the competitive assignment model of the distribution of
earnings in Sattinger (1979), the superstars model of Rosen (1981), and the review of the implications
of competitive assignment models for earnings in Sattinger (1993). Dicks (2009) studies the implications
of the assignment model of CEO pay for corporate governance. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) analyze the
pay of top earners across several occupations (i.e., executives, lawyers and athletes) and find evidence
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argument that the observed high level of CEO pay is a result of entrenched managers
earning excessive rents (eg. Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). In this paper, we show how
the competitive assignment model can also be used to understand the flip side of CEO
pay, namely CEO turnover. We argue along related lines that the observed patterns of
CEO turnover and the dynamics of CEO pay around replacement events are the result
of efficient match formation and dissolution.
That decisions about CEO replacement can be driven by industry conditions and
observable managerial characteristics can be seen clearly in current events. The future of
the CEOs in the beleaguered US auto and financial services industries is being debated
by the media and influenced by government interventions. However, not all CEOs face
the same termination risk. For example, the US government forced GM’s Rick Wagoner
out by threatening to withhold further bailout money, but allowed Chrysler’s Robert
Nardelli to stay on. In an article about the replacement, the Wall Street Journal noted
that, “Unlike Mr. Wagoner, who had been at the helm of GM since 2000, Mr. Nardelli is
considered an auto-industry outsider.”7 Similarly, there has been speculation that CEOs
in the financial services industry might also be ousted. Consider the cases of criticized
CEOs Vikram Pandit of Citigroup and Ken Lewis of Bank of America. In September
2009 Ken Lewis announced that he will step down as the CEO of Bank of America after
public and government pressure, however Pandit is still managing Citigroup after vast
losses and government capital injections. We argue that it may be Pandit’s firm specific
skill, and knowledge of the complex balance sheet of Citigroup that may make it efficient
to retain him even though his general skill set may be better matched to an environment
in which financial institutions are growing, and better able to bear risk. In general, given
the intricate nature of financial institutions, firm-specific and industry specific knowledge
may be critical to weathering the financial crisis and this may make outsider replacements
untenable. Indeed, Bank of America replaced Ken Lewis with the head of their consumer
banking division, Brian Moynihan.
Viewing managers as hedonic goods is useful for considering how industry shocks
might drive CEO turnover since weights on particular skills are likely to be correlated
within industries. For example, the natural life cycle of industries is one of sales growth
followed by increasing competition and then necessary restructuring and cost cutting.
In future work, it may also be interesting to use a hedonic pricing model to understand
consistent with the superstar model.
7March 30 2009 issue, available on-line at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123836090755767077.html.
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which of the scarce skills general managers possess drives the high pay of talented CEOs.
For example, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) and Frydman
(2005) have used the hypothesis that general managerial skills have increased in im-
portance relative to firm-specific skills to understand the rise in CEO pay over time.
However, in this paper we focus mainly on turnover events, and study the dynamics of
CEO pay only around turnover events.
Our empirical work contributes to the existing literature by studying a large dataset of
CEO replacements we construct to describe turnover events which occur during the period
1992-2006. We collect information regarding both the reason for the incumbent CEO’s
departure and the identity and background of the new CEO. To test our theoretical
predictions, we study the effect of firm and industry conditions on the likelihood of
turnovers classified as forced departures, potential quits or retirements. We similarly
document the determinants of the choice of whether the replacement CEO will be a firm
insider, industry insider, or firm and industry outsider. Empirically, a large fraction of
turnover events cannot be unambiguously classified as either firings or quits. We refer to
these events as potential quits, since they may include instances where the CEO chose
to leave the firm for another job and was not necessarily forced out. Interestingly, in the
context of a competitive assignment model where separations occur when total surplus
becomes negative, this is also the case. Under most reasonable theoretical definitions
of fires vs. quits, a large fraction of separations in data generated by the model would
remain unclassified.
We first show that our dataset confirms earlier findings that poor industry stock re-
turns and low firm stock performance relative to the industry increase the likelihood of
forced turnover. Controlling for firm relative to industry stock returns, we find that low
firm relative to industry return on assets (ROA) also increases the likelihood of forced
turnovers. Thus, real variables contain additional information about CEO performance.
Not surprisingly, retirements and potential quits appear to be much less affected by rela-
tive firm performance than are forced turnovers. Poor firm performance still significantly
increases the likelihood of these types of turnovers too, but the magnitude of the effect is
less than a quarter of the effect of poor performance on the likelihood of forced turnovers.
Further, as predicted by our theoretical framework, we show that the independent
effects of industry conditions on turnover may be driven by the fact that industry shocks
can change what type of manager is optimal. For example, industries which experience
a decline in the long term trend of return on assets, have lower stock returns, or have
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lower average ROA also experience more forced turnovers. Importantly, firms that force
departures are more likely to choose a replacement CEO from outside the industry,
consistent with the idea that the firm desires to match with a new manager with a
different skill set than that of the incumbent.
We also show that industry conditions affect the CEO’s decision to depart the firm
voluntarily. Potential quits are more frequent in industries with down-trending ROA,
and with lower average stock returns and ROA, suggesting that in those industries the
outside option of the CEO of leisure or perhaps joining private firms is more valuable than
the expected payments received by staying with the firm during the industry downturn.
Retirements are less frequent in industries with higher employment growth, possibly
indicating that part of the rent captured by active CEOs comes from empire building
(e.g. managing organizations with many employees).
Replacement CEOs are significantly more likely to come from outside the firm and
outside the industry when the firm does poorly in terms of stock returns and return
on assets, or when the industry has low ROA, which are instances where typically the
incumbent CEO is fired. Replacement CEOs are more likely to come from inside the firm
if the turnover event was due to retirement or voluntary departure rather than forced
turnover. The pay of replacement CEOs is highest in situations where the incumbent
was fired and the new CEO is an outsider, as predicted by our competitive assignment
model.
Our paper builds on the results of a large body of work8 on CEO turnover. One of the
most documented facts is that relative performance evaluation (RPE) matters for CEO
turnover: the probability of CEO turnover is negatively related to the performance of
the firm relative to the industry (Barro and Barro (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990))
or to the market (Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988)).
However, RPE does not seem to be the only driver of managerial changes. Jenter and
Kanaan (2006) document that CEOs are more likely to be dismissed from their job after
bad industry and bad market performance, and in light of these findings argue that RPE
cannot be the sole determinant of CEO turnover. They suggest two hypotheses consistent
with the empirical results. First, corporate boards may commit systematic attribution
errors and credit or blame the CEO for performance caused by factors outside their
control. Second, firm performance in bad times may be more revealing about CEO skill
than performance in good times. In our model, the relevance of industry conditions
8See Murphy (1999) for a review of the literature on CEO compensation and turnover.
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for whether or not a CEO is forced out comes from considering the firm and CEO as
parties in a match whose actions depend on their respective outside options. The data
support this idea since the type of turnover event helps to predict the type and pay of
the replacement CEO chosen.
Several papers have focused on the relationship between corporate governance, com-
pensation and CEO turnover. Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that the frequency
of forced turnover and of outside succession increased over time during 1971 to 1994, and
that board characteristics influence the likelihood of these events. Kaplan and Minton
(2006) argue that the CEO turnover rate during 1992-2005 is higher than previously
found for the prior two decades (11.8% versus 10%) and attribute this to boards becom-
ing increasingly more sensitive to the CEO’s performance. Peters and Wagner (2007)
suggest that this recent increase in turnover has lead to a significant increase in CEO
pay, as executives face a higher risk of losing their jobs.
The role of industry conditions on CEO turnover has not received much attention
in the literature. This may be because historically, the literature on CEO turnover
has focused on the role of boards as monitors of the firm and has attempted to ascer-
tain their effectiveness in this role.9 Notable exceptions are Parrino (1997) and Eisfeldt
and Rampini (2008). Parrino (1997) argues that intra-industry CEO appointments are
less costly and performance measures are more precise in homogeneous industries, and,
consistent with this argument, finds that the likelihood of forced turnover and of an intra-
industry appointment increase with industry homogeneity. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008)
show how aggregate business cycle conditions can drive CEO turnover and compensation
in a principal agent environment where managers have private information about their
skill. Their focus, however, is on external turnover due to mergers and acquisitions.
2 Model
Our model is similar to the competitive assignment models used to explain the rise in, and
high levels of CEO compensation, except that in those models skill is one-dimensional
and there is only one industry. In fact, we believe we are the first to develop a com-
petitive assignment model with two industries, or markets, although the two market set
up might be useful for modeling marriage markets, general labor markets, or real estate
markets as well. Having two industries is useful for studying turnover, but it does add
9We thank Robert Parrino for this helpful historical perspective on the literature.
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complication since firm and manager outside options depend on conditions in both in-
dustries. Similarly, one dimensional heterogeneity across managers and firms is a useful
simplification which allows one to derive managers’ wage profiles as a function of talent
in a straightforward manner. Considering that managerial skills are multidimensional is,
however, more realistic and consistent with the evidence in Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
which documents managerial fixed effects in management style, and Kaplan, Klebanov,
and Sorensen (2008) who show that multiple personal characteristics matter for the suc-
cess of a CEO candidate at getting the job. It is also natural to think that firms’ skill
demands change over time, and are correlated within industries and we will utilize this
idea.
Our modeling strategy is most closely related to Tervio (2008) who uses the model
from Sattinger (1979) in which skills are one-dimensional, skill and size distributions are
continuous, and firm size and CEO ability are complementary in production, to analyti-
cally describe the relationship between CEO talent, firm size, and CEO pay. Gabaix and
Landier (2008) employ extreme value theory to show quantitatively that such a model can
explain the rise in and level of CEO pay. Finally, in a closely related model, Murphy and
Zabojnik (2004) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) incorporate firm-specific vs. general
skill by modeling firms as only being able to deploy a fraction of a new CEO’s ability. The
remaining fraction represents firm-specific skill which can only be deployed by incumbent
managers. Murphy and Zabojnik use their model to explain the rise in CEO pay by an
increase in the importance of general managerial skills through comparative statics over
this fraction. Our model and solution methods will closely follow Tervio (2008) adapted
to our set up with multidimensional heterogeneity and more than one industry.
First, we will describe our general set up and illustrate how industry conditions might
affect managerial and firm outside options. Since CEO-firm matches will dissolve when
total match surplus becomes negative, such variation in outside options will naturally
drive turnover events. In this general set up, we will allow for managers to retire, or to
move to another job. Similarly, firms can choose to liquidate, or to find a new manager in
the case that their match dissolves. In this framework, we can describe in general terms
the effects of variation in industry conditions and outside options on turnover events.
We also show how ambiguity in classifying turnover events as firings vs. quits is natural
even in the model. This suggests that even with the best data of what goes on in board
meetings one may not be able to classify turnover events with great precision.
To solve for equilibrium assignments, wages, and profits, we must make some simplify-
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ing assumptions. In section 2.2, we describe a two firm example. The example illustrates
how our model generates relative and absolute performance effects on turnover. There
is what appears to be relative performance evaluation even though there is no learning
or asymmetric information in the model. The example also shows that when industry
conditions deteriorate expensive outside replacements are brought in. These outside re-
placements are expensive because in order for it to be optimal to replace the manager,
the firm must acquire a manger with general skills which outweigh the loss of firm specific
skills. General skills have positive market prices while firm specific skills have no value
outside the firm. Thus, if it makes sense to replace the manager, the firm will need to
pay the replacement more. In the two firm example, pay outside the one industry in
which the two firms operate is exogenous. In section 2.3 we describe a more general
economy, with two industries. In this economy, all allocations, wages, and profits are
pinned down endogenously. We use the two industry economy to provide more detailed
results. First, we show how the model generates both relative and absolute performance
effects on turnover. In the model, CEOs of firms in the bottom of the poorly performing
industry are fired whereas CEOs of firms in the top of the industry which fare better
quit. We also describe the type, pay and performance of the replacement manager rela-
tive to incumbent managers and retained managers at other firms. We show again that
managers who are forced out in poorly performing industries are replaced with highly
paid industry outsiders, and that performance improves under this replacement.
2.1 General Framework
There are two dates, zero and one. At each date, managers will be matched to firms via
competitive assignment. To fix ideas, it is useful to first examine the decision problems of
a single firm and manager at a single date. For this, we consider the decision problems of
a manager and a firm who are currently matched in a competitive assignment economy.
Neither the firm, nor the manager can commit to honoring long term contracts, so each
must earn at least the value of their outside option in each period in order for the
match to continue. The dynamics of optimal managerial compensation induced by agency
problems when long term contracts are feasible is the focus of many recent theoretical
papers.10 Although some of these papers do contain results about contract termination,
10See for example, DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b), He (2007),
DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2009), He (2009), Sannikov (2008), and Lustig, Syverson, and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2009). Sannikov (2008) considers the effects of variation in firm and managerial
8
their main focus is on compensation dynamics rather than CEO turnover. For the most
part termination in these models is rare, and is largely used as a stick to provide incentives
with rather than treated as an object of interest in and of itself. The limited focus on
CEO turnover in the dynamic contracting literature is in contrast to the large empirical
literature on turnover discussed above.
We consider a firm i which produces output using capital and the managerial input
from manager j according to:
ai(mj)k
α,
where ai(mj) is the productivity of capital when firm i employs manager j, and α ∈ [0, 1].
This productivity is given by (slightly abusing notation):
ai(mj) =
S∑
s=1
θi,saj,s
where θi,s is a weight which describes the importance of skill s in determining the pro-
ductivity of capital deployed in firm i and aj,s is the level of ability of manager j in
skill s. Thus the productivity of manager j employed at firm i is the inner product of
manager j’s skill levels and firm i’s skill weights. These weights vary over time and across
firms. Moreover, these weights are likely to be correlated within industries, and subject
to common shocks. For example, growing firms may have high weights on skills such as
building and motivating a sales force, and firms in mature industries may place higher
weights on cost cutting. Firms which can fund growth or operating leverage internally
may not have a high weight on the ability to raise external finance, whereas firms needing
to access capital markets might.11 Similarly, the importance of firm-specific vs. general
skills may vary in the spirit of the evidence documented by Frydman (2005) for the time
series of all firms. The abilities of managers may also vary over time. In particular,
managers may gain firm-specific abilities through learning by doing during their tenure
outside options on the agency costs of providing incentives. DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2009)
consider how exogenous variables affect the degree of agency costs and hence the dynamics of managerial
compensation. Lustig, Syverson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) study how managerial outside options
affect the division of rents between managers and firm owners over time and study the induced distribu-
tions of managerial compensation. He (2007) focuses on the effects of hidden savings on compensation
dynamics. Edmans and Gabaix (2009) provide a survey of how these and other recent theories can
explain “pay-for-luck”.
11Firms may also value particular psychological characteristics or preferences of the CEO. For instance,
Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2009) show that CEOs who are more risk tolerant tend to work for high
growth firms.
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with the firm. Although it is interesting to consider the decision by the manager to invest
in accumulating different skills, for simplicity here we will assume that abilities are fixed
and leave a study of that investment decision for future work.12 Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) document managerial fixed effects in management style, consistent with abilities
being somewhat rigid. For it to be optimal to replace a manager with a suboptimal skill
set, we need to have that there are at least investment costs, adjustment costs, or time
to build for managerial skills, which seems reasonable. The value or total surplus created
by firm i when it is matched with manager j is
V ≡ ai(mj)k
α.
To keep things simple, there is no labor other than the managerial input in our model.
Since we assume that there is no commitment on the part of the manager, the manager
will always need to earn a value inside the match equal to the value of their outside
option. The manager can quit, or they can retire. We assume that there is a market
for managers in which the per period hedonic price of a manager is given by the market
value of that manager’s ability bundle, which we denote by wj . This market is in the
spirit of that formalized in Rosen (1974) and Lancaster (1966). Rosen (1974) contains a
description of the technical assumptions which determine the properties of the hedonic
price function. If skill bundles are recombinable, and there is no arbitrage, this function
will be linear but these assumptions seem strong for the CEO market and so we expect
the price function to be nonlinear. Moreover, because bundles cannot be dismantled, the
price of any particular skill will depend on the joint distributions of and demands for
all skills. For this reason, when one is interested in the distribution of CEO pay it is
convenient to assume that skills are one-dimensional, as in Sattinger (1979) and Tervio
(2008). Here, we depart from this assumption but simplify our general model in order to
solve for managerial wages. We illustrate ideas by solving a simple example in Subsection
2.2. Then, in Subsection 2.3 we solve a two industry version of our model with skill levels
and weights carefully specified to allow us to solve the model for turnover and wages in
a parsimonious way. We base our solution method on that in Tervio (2008) adapted to
incorporate the additional heterogeneity and the existence of an alternative industry for
managers.
12In a recent paper Giannetti (2009) presents a model where compensation is designed to incentivize
managers to invest in firm-specific skills.
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If the manager can either stay at his current employer, quit for his next best employ-
ment option, or retire, then the manager’s outside option is:
V mj ≡ max {wj, R}
where R is the value of retiring.
The firm’s owners will also need to be paid their outside option. The firm can fire the
manager and hire a replacement, or it can liquidate. The firm’s outside option is given
by:
V fi ≡ max
{
max
n
{ai(mn)k
α − (V mn)} , L
}
.
The left hand argument is the value the firm receives with the optimal replacement
manager, where ai(mn) and V
mn are defined analogously to the productivity of manager
j at firm i and the outside option of manager j defined above as a function of the market
prices of manager n’s skills. The right hand argument, L, is the liquidation value of the
firm.
The current match will dissolve if total surplus from the match is negative, in other
words if the value created by the current match after payments to capital and labor,
minus the manager’s outside option, minus the firm’s outside option, is negative, i.e. if:
(ai(mj)k
α)− (max {wj, R})
− (max {maxn {ai(mn)k
α − (V mn)} , L}) < 0
or,
V − V mj − V fi < 0.
This condition is analogous to what Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) describe as the “make
or buy” tradeoff, except that skills are multidimensional.
Considering this general model, there are several channels through which changes
in exogenous variables such as industry conditions might drive total surplus below zero
and thereby drive CEO turnover. Throughout the description of this model we used
simple notation and suppressed the dependence of skill weights, skill prices, the pool
of replacement managers, the value of retirement and liquidation and the productivity
of capital on industry conditions. However, we think that such conditions likely affect
all of these variables. Consider first the potential effects of a deterioration in industry
conditions on the outside option of the firm. As the industry declines, the optimal
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managerial skill bundle may change, for instance to more heavily weigh cost cutting or
the ability to access capital markets. We model this explicitly in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Firms may find it profitable to fire incumbent managers and hire managers with the
newly more desirable bundle. Thus our model can generate more forced turnover or
firings when industry conditions are poor under what seem to be reasonable assumptions
about the relationship between the firm’s outside option and what is going on in the
industry. Next, consider how industry conditions might change the outside option of the
manager and lead to managers quitting for better jobs or retiring. Changes in industry
conditions can change skill prices and lead the manager to leave for greener pastures.
Finally, industry conditions can change the relative value of retirement through affecting
the disutility of work and the value of retirement compensation packages.
Industry conditions affect turnover in the competitive assignment model and in the
data. However, firm relative to industry performance is the most important predictor of
observing an instance of forced turnover, both in our data and in that of previous studies.
The finding that RPE apparently has such a large empirical contribution to turnover
seems to suggest that there is quite a bit of private information and/or learning about
CEO ability. However, note that even without private information one might observe
what would appear to be RPE driven turnover in data generated by a model like the one
described. In particular, if there are any fixed costs of managerial replacement (such as
the loss of firm specific skills), such fixed costs will lead to a cutoff rule for performance
below which managers will be fired.13 Thus, finding that RPE drives turnover does not
show that boards are effectively dealing with a problem of asymmetric information. The
empirical relationship between poor performance and turnover may simply be due to
variation in the importance or level of firm or industry specific skills which may lead only
the poorest performing firms to seek replacements. Alternatively, there may be other
fixed costs of replacement which would also lead to performance thresholds for firing
managers. On the other hand, the converse is also true. Even if the data did not find
such strong support for RPE, one could still not conclude that boards were not using
RPE to gauge talent and effort if other drivers for turnover also exist. We believe that
both learning about unobservable managerial skills, and shocks to demands for observable
talents, are potentially important contributors to CEO turnover.
13In general, in a dynamic model, such fixed costs will also lead to real option like behavior in the
decision to replace managers. For simplicity, we study a two period economy in section 2.3 in which
such real option considerations have no role. It would be interesting to consider a longer horizon model
with real option effects, but we leave this to future work.
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Explicitly considering the outside options of both managers and firms in our com-
petitive assignment framework illustrates another, perhaps surprising feature of such a
model which is also consistent with the data. In the model, as in the data, it is actually
quite difficult to label a separation as a “quit” or “fire”. Since empirically separations
are typically labeled as quits or fires by utilizing news stories as we do here, one might
think that the large fraction of turnovers which can neither be labeled as quits or fires
are simply misclassified due to lack of information. One might think that if one had
perfect data, that all separations should be able to be labeled one way or the other.
However, even in data generated by the model, quite reasonable theoretical definitions
of quits and firings would imply that for a large fraction of separations, the agent who
initiated the separation is ambiguous. Separations occur when the total surplus from the
current match is negative. As discussed, this can occur for many reasons on the part of
the firm and the manager, both of whose outside options vary over time, or it can be that
the total value of the match declines. Furthermore, the outside options of the firm and
the manager, as well as the value created by the match depend on the same variables,
namely, skill weights and prices.
We discuss this ambiguity in the context of one specific definition of “quits” vs. “fires”
but note that the model permits others. We introduce time subscripts and suppress
individual agent subscripts to define a separation as follows:
Definition 1 A separation occurs in the current period when a match satisfies the
following two conditions:
Condition 1 Vt − V
m
t − V
f
t < 0
and
Condition 2 Vt−1 − V
m
t−1 − V
f
t−1 > 0.
Now, consider defining a separation as initiated by one agent (either the manager or
the firm) if that agent would choose to remain in the match with the current match value
and the current outside option of the other agent, but with their own lagged outside
option. This separation must satisfy conditions 1 and 2 as well as either
Condition 3 (Q) Vt − V
m
t−1 − V
f
t > 0
if the separation is a quit, and
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Condition 4 (F) Vt − V
m
t − V
f
t−1 > 0
if the separation is a fire. Note that conditions 1 and Q together simply say that V mt >
V mt−1, while conditions 1 and F together simply say that V
f
t > V
f
t−1. These two inequalities
are not mutually exclusive, so clearly many separations would be unclassified under this
definition. We can, however, refine this definition further.
Add to the definition above that the initiating agent would not want to remain in
the match even given the current match value, that agent’s current outside option, and
the other agent’s lagged outside option. If conditions Q and F are associated with quits
and fires, these new conditions basically state that quits must also not be firings, and
likewise firings must also not be quits. In other words, they require that the separation
also satisfy
Condition 5 (¬F) Vt − V
m
t − V
f
t−1 < 0
if the separation is a quit, and
Condition 6 (¬Q) Vt − V
m
t−1 − V
f
t < 0
if the separation is a fire.
Then, a quit can be defined as a separation which satisfies Q and ¬F. Combining
these two conditions, and condition 1 with condition Q yields the following definition of
a quit:
Definition 2 A separation is a quit if V mt > V
m
t−1 and V
m
t − V
m
t−1 > V
f
t − V
f
t−1.
Similarly, a fire can be defined as a separation which satisfies F and ¬Q. Combining
these two conditions, and condition 1 with condition F yields the following definition of
a firing:
Definition 3 A separation is a fire if V ft > V
f
t−1 and V
f
t − V
f
t−1 > V
m
t − V
m
t−1.
Even these very loose definitions permit separations that cannot be classified in cases in
which the total value of the match drives the surplus negative and outside options remain
unchanged. More strict definitions of quits and fires, such as the one given by conditions
Q and F only, or requiring a quit to satisfy V mt > V
m
t−1 and V
f
t ≤ V
f
t−1 and requiring a fire
to satisfy V ft > V
f
t−1 and V
m
t ≤ V
m
t−1, would lead to even more ambiguous separations.
However, note that in the model, as in the data, the type of replacement manager, and
the compensation of that manager, would yield additional information about the type of
separation observed.
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2.2 Two Firm Example
We now consider CEO turnover and pay in a simple stylized equilibrium example of our
model. There are two firms (A and B) in the industry, and four potential managers (w,
x, y, and z), each with three skills, namely, industry or firm specific knowledge, sales
growth ability, and cost cutting ability. There are two dates, 0 and 1. Production is
linear (i.e., α = 1), the interest rate is zero, there is no labor, and capital k is fixed at 1
unit for each firm.14 Table 1 describes the firm skill weights and managerial skill levels.
At date 0, Firm A has θ weights (3, 2, 0) on the 3 skills respectively. Firm B has θ
weights (0, 1, 0) on the 3 skills respectively. Thus, both firms weight sales growth ability,
and firm A weighs industry specific skills more heavily (it produces a more complex
good, for example). Firm A is more productive since all weights are at least as great
as those for firm B. Manager w has skill levels (1, 1, 0), manager x has skill levels (0,
1, 0), manager y has skill levels (0, 0, 1), and manager z has skill levels (0, 0, 3), for
the 3 skills respectively. Thus, manager w has industry specific skills and sales growth
skills, manager x has sales growth skills, and managers y and z have cost cutting skills.
Managers who do not get hired may deploy their non-industry specific skills in another
industry which has weights equal to one on sales growth and cost cutting and capital
equal to 1
2
. Firms in this alternative industry face free entry and earn zero profits, thus,
managers’ who are not hired have outside options equal to 1
2
∑
s=2:3 as.
An equilibrium at date 0 is an allocation of managers to firms, wages paid to managers,
and firm profits, such that no manager and no firm prefers an alternative allocation. One
such equilibrium is as follows: Firm B hires manager x, produces 1 unit of output, pays
the manager 1
2
+ ǫ in order to make the manager prefer to work at firm B instead of in
the alternative industry, and has profits of 1
2
− ǫ. Firm A hires manager w, produces 5
units of output, pays the manager 1
2
+ 2ǫ in order to make the manager prefer to work
at firm A instead of firm B, and has profits of 41
2
− 2ǫ. Table 2 describes the equilibrium
allocation at date 0.
At the beginning of time 1, a shock changes the weights on the skill bundles at firm A
and B. The formerly young industry is now mature and firms A and B should cut costs
instead of growing sales. At date 1, Firm A’s θ weights are shocked to (3, 0, 2) on the 3
skills respectively. Firm B’s θ weights are shocked to (0, 0, 1) on the 3 skills respectively.
Due to the shock to the skill weights, output in the industry immediately falls from 6
14One can incorporate variation in size if one considers the θ weights to be weights times capital. In
other words, define θ˜jn ∈ {0, 1} and let θ
j
n = θ˜
j
ng(kj) where g
′(kj) > 0.
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units to 3 units. Firms may choose to terminate their managers and replace them. First,
imagine that only managers (w, x, and y) are available. In this case, one equilibrium is
as follows: Firm B hires manager y, produces 1 unit of output, pays the manager 1
2
+ ǫ in
order to make the manager prefer to work at firm B instead of in the alternative industry,
and has profits of 1
2
− ǫ. Firm A decides to retain its manager, w, produces 3 units of
output, pays the manager 1
2
+ ǫ in order to make the manager prefer to work instead
of being employed in the alternative industry for 1
2
, and makes profits of 21
2
− ǫ. Thus,
in this case, only the relatively poorly performing firm fires its manager. However, if
manager z is available, a candidate equilibrium is: Firm B hires manager y, produces
1 unit of output, pays the manager 1
2
+ ǫ in order to make the manager prefer to work
at firm B instead of in the alternative industry, and has profits of 1
2
− ǫ. Firm A hires
manager z, produces 6 units of output, pays the manager 21
2
+ 2ǫ in order to make the
manager prefer to work at firm A instead of firm B and makes profits of 31
2
− 2ǫ. Thus,
the industry shock may cause both firms to turn over their CEO’s. Table 3 describes the
equilibrium allocation at date 1.
Firms will not want to pay for skills they do not find valuable, so when a shock
changes skill weights they are likely to look outside the industry, where these new skills
have been previously productively deployed, for their replacement. Notice also that if
the outside option of deploying general skills in other industries is higher than that of
deploying industry specific skills, the outsiders will tend to be more highly paid relative
to their contribution to output. In the example, consider firm A’s choice of replacement.
To dominate the existing manager, the outsider replacement needs to be able to generate
considerably higher output since all of that output is generated by skills with positive
market prices. As a result, the firm will require much higher output under the new
manager in order to be able to pay the manager the higher required wage and still
increase profits. Thus, when an outsider is hired, output increases significantly and so
does CEO compensation. In our example, output in the industry first decreases from 6
to 3 and then increases to 7 after managerial reallocation. CEO pay increases from 1+3ǫ
in the time 0 equilibrium allocation to 3 + 3ǫ in the time 1 equilibrium allocation.
2.3 Two Industry Economy
In this section, we consider CEO turnover in a two industry version of our example
economy. The model generates turnover which is consistent with relative performance
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evaluation, however overall industry performance is also a key predictor of turnover. The
model has distinct predictions for quits vs. firings, and also speaks to the type and pay of
the replacement manager. For example, one key fact which emerges from our empirical
exercise below is that turnovers which occur in industry downturns are more likely to
be forced turnovers which result in replacements by industry outsiders at relatively high
pay. Our model also generates this result and yields the intuition that this is because
industry downturns may be due to the fit of the manager deteriorating, causing the firm
to look elsewhere for the necessary skills. Because firms who fire their manager must give
up output from cheap firm specific skills, to improve output and raise profits they will
require high levels of expensive general skills in their choice of replacement manager and
hence replacement manager pay will be relatively high.
We extend the standard competitive assignment model in two ways. First, we con-
sider mangers with multidimensional skills and firms with multidimensional skill weights.
Second, we consider the equilibrium in an economy where managers’ outside options may
be outside their current industry, in a competing industry where matching is also deter-
mined via competitive assignment. To our knowledge we are the first to consider a two
market competitive assignment model, however the framework would be interesting for
other markets as well, such as marriage markets, student markets, real estate markets,
or general labor markets.
The basic assignment model of Sattinger (1979), Tervio (2008), and Gabaix and
Landier (2008) is built upon the following three simplifying assumptions: First, skills
and firm characteristics are one-dimensional (managers have talent and firms have a size),
second, the distributions of talent and firm size are continuous, and third, firm size and
talent are complements. Assuming skills have only one dimension significantly simplifies
the analysis because wages do not depend on the joint distributions of managerial skills
and firm skill weights. However, if one chooses the distributions carefully, and adopts the
assumptions that skill distributions and firm skill weights are continuous and firm skill
weights and managerial skill levels are complementary, then the analytical techniques
used in Tervio (2008) can be applied to solve for equilibrium wage and profit profiles.
There are two dates, zero and one. There are two industries, A and B, and two types
of managers, x and z. All firms have capital stocks equal to one.15 There are measure one
of firms in each industry, and measure one of each type of manager. Thus, there will be
15One can incorporate variation in size if one considers the θ weights to be weights times capital. In
other words, define θ˜jn ∈ {0, 1} and let θ
j
n = θ˜
j
ng(kj) where g
′(kj) > 0.
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no unemployment. Similarly, to keep things manageable, we will not consider retirement
or liquidation here although they would be interesting extensions.16 As in the example
above, skill levels and weights have three components, namely, firm specific skills, sales
growth skills, and cost cutting skills, respectively. The level of firm specific skill will
depend on the industry the manager works in. In industry A, the more productive
industry, managers will develop firm specific skill in proportion to their general skill and
will have firm specific skill greater than zero if they work at their incumbent firm and
zero otherwise. Industry B is the less productive industry, and is a generalist industry.
Managers working in this industry do not accumulate firm specific skill. General skill
levels are fixed characteristics of managers. Type x managers have sales growth skills
distributed uniformly between zero and two, and have zero cost cutting skills. Type
x managers have firm specific skills ax0 = a
x
1 iff they work at their incumbent firm in
industry A.
The opportunity cost of losing firm specific skills acts like a fixed firing cost and leads
to what appears to be relative performance evaluation since only the poorest performing
managers will be fired. However, note that there is no asymmetric information, and no
learning in our model. One implication of the effect of firm specific skills is that cutoff
levels for firing should be lower in industries where managers have high levels of firm
specific skill and this seems to make sense.17
For managers of type x, we have,
ax0 ∼ U(1, 3),
if type x managers are incumbents at their industry A firms,
ax1 ∼ U(1, 3),
and ax2=0. Type z managers have a
z
0 equal to zero even if they work at their incumbent
firm in industry B since industry B is a generalist industry. Type z managers have cost
cutting skills distributed uniformly between zero and two, and have zero sales growth
16One could consider varying the outside options of the least productive operating firm pi0 and least
talented employed manager w0 in the single market equilibrium.
17This is basically applying the intuition used in Frydman (2005) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007)
used to explain the time series of turnover events to the cross section.
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skills. Thus, for type z managers we have,
az2 ∼ U(0, 2),
and az1=0.
Again, firm level productivity will be given by the inner product of managerial skill
levels and firm skill weights. Firm skill weights can change over time. In particular, we
will consider the effects on turnover and managerial compensation of a date 1 shock to
the skill weights in industry A. At time zero, firms in industry A have skill weights as
follows:
θA0 ∼ U(1, 3), θ
A
1 ∼ U(1, 3), and θ
A
2 = 0.
We assume that θA0 and θ
A
1 are perfectly correlated so that the firm with the highest firm
specific skill weight also has the highest general skill weights. When ordered between
zero and one, the oneth firm has the highest weights and is the most productive. Firms
in industry B have constant skill weights as follows:
θB0 = 0, θ
B
1 ∼ U(0, 1), and θ
B
2 ∼ U(0, 1).
Notice that industry A is more productive than industry B. Industry B also values both
general skills. It is a generalist industry, and one that employs a pool of potential
replacements for the more productive industry A. Since in practice CEO to CEO job
transitions are rarely observed, one might think of the industry B managers as division
managers in large firms.
At date zero, managers are matched with firms via competitive assignment. Given our
assumptions, at this date the economy reduces to two distinct competitive assignment
markets, and the equilibrium assignment is given by the equilibrium assignments in each
of the markets separately. All managers of type x will work in industry A, and all
managers of type z will work in industry B. Industry A only values sales growth skills,
which are possessed by type x managers. Since industry A is more productive and will
pay more for these skills, type x mangers will choose to work there. We assume that the
economy at date t = −1 is described by the same parameters as those at time zero, so
that all managers in industry A have ax0 > 0 since they will work for their incumbent
firms.
We now describe output, managerial compensation, and profits in the two industries.
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Our analysis closely follows that in Tervio (2008) and it may be useful for the reader
to refer to Section I of that paper for additional details. As in Tervio (2008), it will be
convenient to consider the inverse distribution functions for skill levels and skill weights.
Managers and firms are ordered on the unit interval as described above so that for each
manager type y ∈ {x, z} and each skill type n ∈ {0, 1, 2} ayn[i] is the skill level of a
quantile i type y manager and the derivative of the inverse distribution satisfies ay′n [i] ≥ 0
for each skill type, with strict inequality for general skills. For each manager and skill
type, if F yan is the cumulative distribution of an for type y, then the profile of an is given
by
ayn[i] = a
y
n s.t. F
y
an
(an) = i.
Basically, ayn[i] gives the ability level of the i
th type y manager. The inverse dis-
tribution functions for firms’ skill weights are defined analogously for industries A and
B.
In each industry, the equilibrium assignment must satisfy two types of constraints.
First, the sorting constraints state that each firm must prefer hiring its manager at their
equilibrium wage to hiring any alternative manager at that replacement manager’s equi-
librium wage. Second, the participation constraints state that all firms and individuals
must earn their outside option for opportunities outside of industries A and B. In our
economy, we set these outside options to be equal to zero, and leave the study of vari-
ation in liquidation and retirement options to future research. We have the following
constraints where boldface type is used to denote vectors:
V (ax[i], θA[i])− wx[i] ≥ V (ax[j], θA[i])− wx[j] ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1] SC(i, j) (1)
V (ax[i], θA[i])− wx[i] ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1] PC θA[i] (2)
wx[i] ≥ 0 PC ax[i] (3)
Analogous sorting constraints must hold across industries, but we ignore them at date 0
since they will not be binding. They will bind for some agents at date 1. Note also that
the only binding sorting constraints within an industry are those which consider hiring
the next best manager. Since firms in industry A at time zero have θA2 = 0, and managers
of type x have ax2 = 0, to compute the efficient assignment in industry A one only needs
to consider the effects of ax1 and θ
A
1 . Moreover, because firm specific skills are not valued
outside the firm, wages in industry A will be determined solely by the distributions for
ax1 and θ
A
1 . As a result, the date zero economy reduces to two economies of the type
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studied in Tervio (2008). Analogous constraints must be satisfied in industry B which
will employ type z managers. Since managers of type z only have cost cutting skills az2,
to compute the efficient assignment in industry B one only needs to consider the effects
of az2 and θ
B
2 . The participation constraints will bind for the lowest ability manager and
the lowest productivity firm.
We now solve for wages and profits at time zero. Regrouping the sorting constraints
for types i and i− ǫ and dividing by ǫ yields:
V (ax[i], θA[i])− V (ax[i− ǫ], θA[i])
ǫ
≥
wx[i]− wx[i− ǫ]
ǫ
.
Taking the limit as ǫ→ 0 we get the slope of the wage profile for type x managers:18
wx′[i] = Va(a
x[i], θA[i]) · ax′[i].
Finally, integrating, and adding the binding participation constraint yields the wage
profile:
wx[i] = w0 +
∫ i
0
Va(a
x[j], θA[j]) · ax′[j] dj
Again, since firm specific skills are not valued outside the firm, and firms in industry A
at time zero have θA2 = 0, to compute wages one only needs to consider the effects of a
x
1
and θA1 . Note that the sorting constraints could have been written from the manager’s
perspective, and an analogous profile for profits can be obtained as follows:19
πA[i] = π0 +
∫ i
0
Vθ(a
x[j], θA[j]) · θA′[j] dj.
Using the distributions for θA and ax, the definition V (ax[i], θA[i]) = ax[i] · θA[i] kα,
18Note that because of the discontinuity in the value of a0 as managers change firms one technically
can’t use this argument for firm specific skills. Firm specific skills are unpriced and have a wage of zero
at date zero. One can think of taking the limit only over the part of V which comes from general skills,
and then adding the output and profits from general skills separately.
19Here again, due to the discontinuity in ax0 across firms, one can integrate over the general skills
contribution to profits and add the contribution of firm specific skills separately.
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and the fact that k = 1 ∀i, we have that output in industry A is given by:20
V A(i, i) = 1 + 6i+ 8i2
wages, or managerial outside options are given by,21
wx(i) = 2i+ 2i2
and firm profits are given by22
πA(i) = 2 + 6i+ 6i2.
When the retirement option has zero value, then w = V m where V m is as described in
Section 2. Similarly, when liquidating has zero value, then π = V f .
Figure 1 graphs output, wages, and profits in industry A. Take for example, firm 1
2
who is matched with manager 1
2
. Output is 6. Of this, 1.5 is paid to the manager and
4.5 is retained by the firm. However, note that the manager receives the majority of the
portion of output created from general skills, which is 2. These wages are graphed in
figure 1 as the shaded area to the left of the matching function for the (1
2
, 1
2
) match.
Similarly, for industry B, which in equilibrium employs managers of type z, we have:23
V B(i, i) = 2i2
wages, or managerial outside options are given by,24
wz(i) = i2
and firm profits are given by25
πB(i) = i2.
20To compute output, note that output equals θ0(i)a0(i)+ θ1(i)a1(i)+ θ2(i)a2(i) and use the distribu-
tions for skills and skill weights to compute output as a function of i. In particular, note that θA
0
= 1+2i,
ax0 = 1 + 2i, θ
A
1 = 1 + 2i, a
x
1 = 2i, θ
A
2 = 0, and a
x
2 = 0.
21For wages, note that ax1 [j] = 2j so that a
x′
1 [j] = 2, and θ
A
1 (j) = 1 + 2j so
∫ i
0
θA1 (j) dj = i+ i
2.
22For profits from general skills, note that θA
1
(j) = 1+2j so θA′
1
(j) = 2 and ax
1
(j) = 2j so
∫ i
0
ax
1
(j) dj =
i2.
23To compute output, note that θB0 = 0, a
z
0 = 0, θ
B
1 = i, a
z
1 = 0, θ
A
2 = i, and a
z
2 = 2i.
24For wages, note that az
2
[j] = 2j so that az′
2
[j] = 2, and θB
2
(j) = j so
∫ i
0
θA
2
(j) dj = 1
2
i2.
25For profits from general skills, note that θA
2
(j) = j so θB′
1
(j) = 1 and az
2
(j) = 2j so
∫ i
0
az
2
(j) dj = i2.
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a1[1]=2
a1[0]=0
a1[1/2]=1
θ1[0]=1 θ1[1/2]=2 θ1[1]=3
Figure 1: Industry A General Skill Output, Wages, and Profits.
We now consider a shock to firm skill weights in industry A, and the resulting effects
on managerial assignment and turnover, and wages and profits in industries A and B.
Imagine that industry A had been a growing industry but has now matured and firms
thus need to focus on cost cutting instead of sales growth. This change in industry
conditions induces a change in the skill weights in industry A. In particular, we examine
the effects of a switch in which θA1 and θ
A
2 exchange values. Thus, θ
A
1 becomes zero for
all firms, and θA2 becomes positive and is distributed uniformly across firms between one
and three. Weights in industry B do not change.
We show that the resulting reallocation of managers is as follows: The most talented
managers in industry A remain with their firms. They are incumbents. There is a
cutoff level of talent below which all managers in industry A are fired and reallocate to
industry B. Call the index of this talent level i∗A. Because industry A is more productive,
the managers at the top end of industry B will quit and reallocate to replace the fired
managers at the bottom of industry A. Call the index of the talent level above which
type z managers quit industry B to work in industry A i∗B and note that i
∗
B = 1 − i
∗
A.
The fired managers from industry A will go to work in industry B.
We solve for the competitive assignment equilibrium at date 1 as follows: First, we
guess that there is a cutoff rule for managerial turnover as described above. Then,
conditional on this rule, we compute equilibrium wages and output. We can then solve
for the cutoff value, and verify that we have found an equilibrium. The equilibrium must
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a2[1]=2
a2[0]=0
a2[1/2]=1
θ2[0]=0 θ2[1/2]=2 θ2[1]=3
Figure 2: Industry B General Skill Output, Wages, and Profits.
satisfy the sorting constraints described for the date zero assignment. In addition, the
date 1 skill weights imply that cross industry sorting constraints will bind for the firms
and/or managers at the cutoffs i∗A and i
∗
B. In particular, firm i
∗
A must be indifferent
between hiring their incumbent manager, and firing their manager and replacing them
with the oneth manager from Industry B. This condition will pin down the cutoff value
i∗A. Similarly, manager i
∗
B must be indifferent between quitting industry B to work at the
bottom of industry A, and staying in industry B. Figure 3 describes the turnover and
reallocation of managers in industries A and B.26
To compute the equilibrium allocations, it is easiest to begin with industry B since
managers there will not have outside options in industry A, whereas managers in industry
A may have outside options in industry B. In industry B, the top managers quit and
move to industry A. The firms whose managers quit can either hire the fired type x
managers being reallocated from industry A, or they can hire the top end of the type z
managers which choose to remain in industry B. When i∗A < i
∗
B, they prefer the higher
skilled type z managers. Now, consider the firms in the bottom of industry B, below the
quitting threshold i∗B. These firms will retain their managers, but also absorb the fired
managers from industry A. The measure of managers being reallocated from industry A
is i∗A. Since industry B firms value both sales growth and cost cutting skills, they are
26This figure and the wage and profit calculations which follow are conditional on i∗A < i
∗
B. If the
opposite is true, similar conditions will hold with mixing in industry B of managers of both types up to
the managers with index i∗B.
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0 1iA
*
Firms: Industry A
Retain incumbent
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*
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*]z
or replace managers with [0, iA
*]x
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*
Quit, replace 
industry A firedRemain incumbent
Figure 3: Turnover and Reallocation in Industries A and B.
indifferent between hiring type x and type z managers with the same index. Thus, the
distribution at the bottom of industry B will be a mixture of the type x and type z
managers with indexes less than i∗A and will have total mass 2i
∗
A. In this region, as one
considers firms with higher indexes, skill will not increase as quickly as in the top region
of industry B in which there is no mixing. In particular, as one changes the firm index
in this region we have that a′[i] = 1. For all output and wage calculations we use i to
denote the firm index, which after reallocation may differ from the index of the manager.
Thus output for firms in industry B with i < 2i∗A is i
2. Wages at firms in industry B with
i < 2i∗A are
1
2
i2. With those payments in hand, one can compute the wages of firms at
the top of industry B. Firms in industry B with indexes i > 2i∗A produce output equal
to (i)(2i − 2i∗A). These firms pay wages equal to
1
2
i∗A + i
2 − 2i∗2A . Talented managers
quitting industry B and being replaced by lower ability managers from industry A leads
to a decline in output in industry B after the departures. Both wages and profits also
decline. Interestingly, profits fall by more than wages even though the average ability
of managers in industry B declines and nothing about firm characteristics has changes.
This is because the managers have better outside options than industry B firms do.
With the allocations and payments in industry B in hand we can compute allocations
and payments in industry A. Firms at the top of industry A, with indexes i > i∗A,
retain their managers. Firms at the bottom of industry A, with indexes i < i∗A, fire
their managers, and replace them with the managers who quit industry B. Thus, relative
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performance evaluation is consistent with the pattern of forced turnover in industry A
even though there is no private information or learning about ability. Moreover, absolute
performance also matters. Output immediately falls in industry A when the shock to the
weights occurs due to the mismatch between firms’ skill needs and the supply of those
skills by their assigned managers. Even after reassignment, total output and profits in
industry A will be lower than before the shock. However, output at firms who fire their
managers will be higher after reallocation than both prior to and after the shock, and
for the most poorly performing firms the same is true for profits. This is consistent with
the pattern we see in the data, as we discuss in section 4. Firms in industry A with
indexes i > i∗A retain their managers and produce output equal to (1 + 2i)(1 + 2i). All
output is generated by firm specific skills since there is zero value from sales growth skill
in industry A after the shock. Firm specific skills lead to only the poorest performing
firms in industry A firing their managers, since doing so entails losing the output and
profits from these skills. Since firm specific skills are unpriced, they are cheaper. Even
so, managers at these firms do not earn zero wages since they must prefer to stay in
industry A rather than quit and go to the top of industry B. The cross industry sorting
constraints thus lead to firm specific skills earning rents for the owning managers. Wages
at these firms are thus 1
2
i∗A + i
2 − i∗2A , and are lower than before the shock. Firms in
industry A with indexes i < i∗A fire their managers and replace them with managers
with indexes i ∈ [i∗B, 1]
z from industry B. Output is (1 + 2i)(2i + 2 − 2i∗A). Wages are
2i+ 2i2 − 6i∗B + 2iB∗.
Figure 4 plots output, wages, and profits in industries A and B.
3 Data
We use four main sources of data: Execucomp for the name and compensation of the
CEOs of 2779 publicly traded companies during 1992-2006, CRSP/Compustat for stock
returns and accounting data for these firms, the industries they belong to, and for stock
market returns, the Bureau of Economic Analysis for industry data referring to both
public and private firms, and Factiva for news stories published in a three-year window
around CEO departures. The information in Factiva allows us to determine the reason
why a CEO left and where the replacement CEO came from.27
27We are also grateful to Dirk Jenter for sharing the data from Jenter and Kanaan (2006) regarding
whether or not a CEO was forced out or left the firm voluntarily (possibly by retiring). Because
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Figure 4: Output, Wages, and Profits in Industries A and B.
We identify 2068 instances where a CEO was replaced, and for which we know both
the reason for the incumbent’s departure, as well as where the new CEO came from. The
replacement event is defined based on whether the same individual has the CEO title (ie.,
for this individual the Execucomp variable CEOANN takes the value ”CEO”) during the
current and subsequent year. If the name of the CEO in year t is different from the name
of the CEO in year t+1, we record this as a turnover event in year t. Later in the analysis
we will refer to the turnover year t as time 0. Of all replacements events, 613 (29.7%) are
the result of a planned retirement decision, announced at least six months prior to the
actual departure date, or of a health-related reason. Another 323 (15.6%) replacements
are instances where the incumbent CEO was forced out, according to newspaper stories
related to the departure. The remaining 1132 (54.7%) cases are those that do not fit
in any of these two categories – retirements or firings – and thus we will label them
unclassified departures. These events include instances where the incumbent voluntarily
left the firm, and therefore we also refer to them as potential quits. Since these unclassified
departures are the residual category, one might expect them to behave like a weighted
average of retirements and forced turnovers. This is true for some empirical relationships
our sample is longer, our data set contains 50% more instances of turnover and we classify these as
forced, unclassified (potential quits), and retirements. Note that we also collect data on the identity
and background of the replacement CEO, and pay and performance subsequent to turnover events. For
turnover events which we identified as forced turnover and which also occurred in the Jenter and Kanaan
(2006) dataset, our classification schemes agreed for 75% of such events. We were also able to identify
16 cases of forced turnover (5% of observations) which we had previously categorized as unclassified by
using the Jenter and Kanaan (2006) data.
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(for example the relationship between relative firm performance and the likelihood of
turnover), but unclassified departures have some distinct characteristics also. We discuss
this more in section 4, but, for example, they have the strongest negative relationship of
all turnover types with contemporaneous market returns.
Our definition of departure type is different from the algorithm described in Par-
rino (1997) and followed by several other papers, in two significant ways. First, and
most important, the extant literature on turnover identifies just two types of departures:
forced and unforced (the latter including retirements). However, since an employment
relationship is the result of a two-sided matching process that depends on conditions in
the executive labor market, we allow for turnover to happen for three reasons: the firm
chooses to terminate the match, the CEO chooses to terminate the match but is still
active in the executive labor market, or the CEO leaves the executive labor market for
exogenous reasons such as age and health. These three types of departure have different
theoretical reasons, as the model suggests, and will be predicted by different variables in
the empirical analysis.
Second, unlike Parrino (1997), we do not condition on the incumbent CEO’s age to
define a departure as forced or not. Parrino (1997) classifies as forced departures all
cases where the CEO is younger than 60, and (1) related news stories do not report
the reason for departure as involving death, poor health or the acceptance of another
job, or (2) the firm reports the departure as a retirement, but does so less than six
months before succession. We believe that it is possible that in some of these instances
managers voluntarily quit the job – they were not fired, nor did they choose to leave
the executive labor market (i.e. retire.) Hence, while in papers using the Parrino (1997)
algorithm the age of the departing CEO is a significant and negative predictor of forced
turnover because of the way forced turnovers are defined, in our analysis this mechanical
relationship does not exist.
4 Empirical Results
The three novel theoretical predictions that we will test empirically are as follows:
(H1) When industry conditions deteriorate, forced turnover is more likely to occur.
(H2) When industry conditions deteriorate, replacement CEOs are more likely to have
skills different from those of departing CEOs.
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(H3) The pay of CEOs reflects the market price of their skill bundles.
In line with these predictions, the empirical evidence we document indicates that the
type of CEO departure, as well as the type of CEO hired as a replacement and their pay
depend strongly on the firm’s need for strategy change and on the outside option of both
the firm and the CEO.
In the analysis we build on the findings of a large empirical literature on CEO
turnover. Typically in this literature either the firm’s stock return or the firm’s re-
turn on assets (ROA) adjusted for industry performance have been used to predict CEO
turnover, and forced turnover in particular. For instance, Gibbons and Murphy (1990),
Murphy (1999), Jenter and Kanaan (2006) and Kaplan and Minton (2006) use stock
returns, while ROA (typically by itself and not in addition to the stock return) is used in
Barro and Barro (1990), Parrino (1997), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), and Huson,
Malatesta, and Parrino (2004). The evidence in these papers indicates that relative per-
formance evaluation (Holmstrom (1982)) is used to determine whether a CEO is fired28
or not: if the firm’s performance (measured as stock return or ROA) relative to the
industry is higher, the probability of the CEO being forced out is lower.
We replicate this result throughout our analysis. For instance, in Table 4 we show
that lagged relative stock return performance (i.e. firm minus average industry return) is
a significant and negative predictor of a CEO being fired.29 We strengthen this result by
showing that a combination of multiple performance benchmarks determine the likelihood
of a CEO being fired. A firm’s stock return and its return on assets – measured relative
to the industry – together contribute to the firing outcome. Since these RPE measures
are noisy and not perfectly correlated signals of the quality of the CEO-firm match, they
all should be inputs in the firing decision.
The second important result we replicate is one documented in Jenter and Kanaan
(2006) and Kaplan and Minton (2006): firings are more likely to occur after bad industry
and bad market performance, measured by stock returns. This effect is illustrated by the
multinomial logit models of departure type in Table 4. Controlling for the firm relative
to industry return, the industry relative to market return (Industry −MarketReturnt)
and the value-weighted market return (VWMarketReturnt) during year t (Panel A) and
28In some of the extant literature, data limitations did not allow for turnovers to be classified as forced
or not forced, but the RPE hypothesis refers to firings, and not to other types of CEO departures.
29We also perform a robustness check by measuring annual returns over July-June instead of January-
December, and the results are similar.
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industry returns (VWFFIndustryReturnt) (Panel B) are significant negative predictors
of the relative likelihood of the CEO being forced out versus there being no turnover
during year t+ 1.30
Although these results have been documented previously, we provide a unique inter-
pretation here. As our competitive assignment model suggests, industry conditions affect
the CEO-firm match surplus and thus drive turnovers. We will now turn to the novel
empirical findings we document, in light of the predictions of our theoretical framework.
4.1 Match dissolution
The first novel hypothesis of the competitive assignment framework that we test, (H1),
states that when industry conditions deteriorate, forced turnover is more likely to occur.
We first observe that turnover of all types, and forced turnover in particular, are
relatively concentrated. Using the Fama French 48 industry classification system, we
find that 50% of all instances of forced turnover occur in just seven industries: Business
Services, Computers, Retail, Utilities, Chips, Machinery and Drugs. Overall turnover
is also concentrated in several industries, although less so than forced turnover. The
top 5% of 608 industry-year bins that our observations belong to account for 22% of all
turnover events, and for 35% of forced turnover. Since these CEO-firm match dissolution
events are not uniformly distributed across industries and over time, we investigate what
specific industry conditions may drive turnover.
Figures 5 and 6 show the relationships between the frequency of firings and potential
quits, and various industry characteristics measured over 1993-2005.31 We use the Fama
French 48 industry classification throughout this analysis. During thus time period, the
average industry-level rates of forced turnover and potential quits are 1.69% and 6.21%,
respectively.
For each industry and each year, we classify the industry as having below-trend ROA
if the industry ROA that year is lower than its three-year average. We then count the
number of below-trend years for each industry during 1993-2005. As shown in Figure 5,
the frequency of firings is significantly higher in industries with below-trend ROA during
more years in the period of 1993-2005 (p < 0.01). One additional year of down-trending
30The negative relationship between the likelihood of forced turnover and either industry returns or
industry relative to market returns is robust to defining lagged returns using July-June windows.
31Since our dataset ends in 2006, the last year for which we can compute turnover rates is 2005. Also,
a large number of firms do not appear in Execucomp in 1992, and due to this incomplete coverage we
drop data from 1992 in our analysis of industry conditions and time trends.
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ROA increases the frequency of forced turnover by 0.2% (from 1.69% to 1.89% in the
average industry).
We also find that industries with lower average ROA have significantly higher firing
rates during 1993-2005 (p < 0.01). A one-standard deviation decrease in the ROA
from 0% (for the average industry) to -5% increases the firing rate by 0.6%. Industries
with lower annual value-weighted stock returns are characterized by higher firing rates
(p < 0.1), whereas those with higher employment growth have more forced turnover
(p < 0.01). The latter result is explained by the fact that in our sample there is a strong
negative correlation between average employment growth in the industry and industry
ROA during 1993-2005 (p < 0.01).
An interesting question is whether there is a significant positive relationship between
firing rates and the industry homogeneity index, as found by Parrino (1997) for the
period 1969-1989. His result implied that it is easier to replace a CEO if there is a
larger pool of suitable candidates to pick from. In unreported regressions, we do not
find this positive correlation in our data. As suggested by Frydman (2005), however, the
importance of firm (or industry-specific) skill has diminished over time, and nowadays
general management skills are most desirable. This would explain why in the recent
time period that we study, we no longer find that industry homogeneity (and thus, the
availability of candidates with firm or industry-specific skills) is a determinant of forced
turnover. Indeed, in a model such as ours, the within industry dispersion in stock returns
might be quite small for an industry which is subject to strong common shocks to CEO
skill weights, however, these common shocks would lead to turnover and the hiring of
outsiders if industry-specific skills were relatively unimportant.32
Figure 6 shows that the frequency of unclassified departures (potential quits) is sig-
nificantly higher in industries with more years of below-trend ROA and with lower value-
weighted stock returns (p < 0.01). All these effects are economically significant. For
instance, decreasing the annual industry-level stock return by one standard deviation
(6.09%) from the sample mean of 12.9% increases the annual frequency of quits by 0.73%,
a significant effect given that the average quits frequency is 6.21% in our data. We do
not find a strong correlation between quits and industry employment growth.
While our theoretical framework is mainly focused on firings and quits, in reality many
instances of turnover are retirements due to exogenous reasons such as age or health. In
32We thank Robert Parrino for sharing with us the industry-level homogeneity index values for the
period 1990-2006.
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our data, the average annual industry-level rate of retirements is 3.32%.33 As shown
in Figure 7, industry characteristics tend not to be significant drivers of the retirement
frequency. The one marginally significant result is that the frequency of retirements
is higher in industries with lower employment growth (p < 0.1). This indicates that
retirement decisions may not be exogenous to the firm or aggregate conditions, as one
might think. CEOs have some leeway in when they choose to retire, and may do so where
their outside option is better than the payoff from staying with the firm. It is possible
that retention payoffs are relatively less attractive in industries with lower employment
growth, if empire-building is part of these payoffs.
To illustrate our main results regarding the link between industry conditions and CEO
turnover using simple statistics, we split observations based on quartiles of industry
conditions. Figure 8 shows the frequency of turnover types as a function of industry
conditions during 1993-2005. The firing rate is 0.5% in the top industry ROA quartile and
2.4% in the bottom quartile. The rate of potential quits is 4.8% in industries belonging to
the quartile with the lowest number of ROA down-trending years, and 6.7% in those with
the most prolonged ROA down-trend. The firing rate is also higher in industries in the
lowest quartile of stock returns (1.7%) than in those in the highest quartile (1.4%), and
in industries with higher employment growth. Retirement frequency is highest (3.7%)
in industries in the highest ROA quartile and lowest (2.4%) in those in the lowest ROA
quartile.
While these univariate results confirm the prediction that CEO-firm match dissolution
depends on industry conditions, we further test this hypothesis in a multivariate setting
using firm-year level data to control for potential confounds. This analysis reveals the
effects of firm and industry conditions on CEO departures, which we document in the
multinomial logit model in Table 5. The dependent variable is categorical and can have
four values, indicating whether in a particular firm (a) there was no CEO change between
years t and t+ 1, (b) the CEO in place in year t was fired and a new CEO took over in
year t+ 1, (c) the CEO in place in year t retired and a new CEO took over in year t+ 1
and (d) the CEO in place in year t left for unknown reasons (potentially quit) and a new
CEO took over in year t+ 1.
The results show that firings are more likely relative to there being no turnover,
if the firm’s stock return or ROA relative to the industry (Firm − IndustryReturnt
33The overall turnover rate for the average industry, which includes firings, potential quits, as well as
retirements is 11.98%.
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and Firm − IndustryROAt) are lower, and if the industry has experienced low stock
returns relative to the market (Industry−MarketReturnt) or a downturn in profitability
as measured by the variable IndustryROABelowTrendt. This variable is an indicator
equal to 1 if the average ROA in the industry during the preceding three years is below
its value during the preceding ten years. We interpret such an event as indicating a
structural break in the profitability of the industry and as signal that the industry is
experiencing bad times. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that when the
firm and the industry experience a downturn, a change in strategy may be optimal –
hence the firm should dissolve the match with the current CEO by forcing him out.
We replicate the univariate result documented above that a higher employment growth
in the industry in year t correspond to a higher firing likelihood at time t. We measure
industry employment growth using either CRSP/Compustat figures for publicly-traded
companies, or the Bureau of Economic Analysis data for public and private companies
classified using NAIC industry codes. Our results hold for either of these measures, as
seen in Panels A and B of Table 5.
Unclassified departures are more likely to happen relative to there being no turnover
if the firm’s stock return, ROA or employment growth relative to the industry is lower,
if the industry ROA is lower, and if the recent three-year industry ROA is below its ten-
year trend, consistent with the univariate results documented earlier. As our theoretical
framework implies, when the industry’s ROA is trending downward, the continuation
value for the incumbent to stay with the firm is low – the prospects of the industry are
not good and the value of future payments to be received from the firm is lower. Another
explanation, outside the competitive assignment model, is that leaving when the industry
is going through bad times may allow the CEO to not be inferred as being of as low a
type if he left while the industry was experiencing a boom. Similarly, the continuation
value for the incumbent is higher when the firm is doing well relative to the industry, in
terms of ROA or stock returns.
We find that if the firm’s stock return or employment growth relative to the industry
are higher, the odds of the CEO retiring decrease. Since CEO compensation increases
with firm stock performance and also with firm size, and some managers may also enjoy
empire building, we interpret these results as indicating that if the value of staying in
the match is higher, the CEO is less likely to retire.
Finally, the results in Table 5 show that CEOs younger than 65 years are significantly
less likely to either retire or leave for unknown reasons, relative to older individuals. At
33
the same time, the likelihood of being fired relative to continuing as a CEO does not
depend on the executive’s age.
4.2 Match formation
In this section we test the second hypothesis, (H2), which states that when industry
conditions deteriorate, replacement CEOs are more likely to have skills different from
those of departing CEOs.
We first document general patterns in the types of replacements hired during 1993-
2005. The frequency of replacements by company insiders has decreased over time from
70% in 1993 to 59.5% in 2005, supporting the argument that general management skills
are now relatively more valuable than firm-specific skills compared to earlier periods (Fry-
dman (2005)). Also, the frequency of replacements by individuals coming from privately-
held firms has increased over time, from 1.75% in 1993 to 5.40% in 2005.
In line with our hypothesis that matches are formed based on the fit of the CEO’s
skill set with the company’s needs, we find evidence suggesting that companies going
through difficult times, either because of idiosyncratic reasons or because of industry
conditions, are more likely to hire replacement CEOs with a different background than
the incumbent executive.
We find that company outsiders are more likely to be brought in after a firing or after a
voluntary departure of the incumbent, which tend to occur when the firm or the industry
experience difficult times, than after a retirement. Moreover, most of these outsiders
are from a different industry according to the Fama French 48 industry classification
system.34
Figure 9 indicates the types of replacement CEOs hired after each type of departure
and suggest that the type of replacement CEO hired depends on the reason for the
departure of the prior CEO. Replacements by company insiders are significantly more
likely if the prior CEO left because of retirement than if he possibly quit or was fired.
In the case of retirements, only 20.3% of the new CEOs are from outside the company:
4.2% are from the same industry, 11.6% are from a different industry, and 4.5% come
from a non-publicly traded company. In the case of possible quits, 28.3% of the new
CEOs are from outside the company: 5.5% are from the same industry, 15.7% are from
a different industry, and 7.1% are from a non-publicly traded company. After firings,
34The same is true if we use the 2-digit SIC industry classification code, which yields 61 different
industries in our sample.
34
37.8% of replacements are company outsiders: 9.1% are from the same industry, 21.2%
from another industry, and 7.5% from a non-publicly traded company.
We check the robustness of these results by estimating a multinomial logit model
of the relative likelihood of various types of replacement CEOs as function of the prior
CEO’s departure reason, and industry fixed-effects. The results are shown in Table 6
and confirm the unconditional findings.
To get more direct evidence that industry conditions matter for the type of replace-
ment CEO hired, we split the firm-year observations into those belonging to industries
with below-average and above-average ROA during 1993-2005. To keep the analysis sim-
ple, we bundle together all three types of replacement CEOs from outside the company,
and refer to these individuals as “outsiders”. Replacement CEOs hired from within the
firm are referred to as “insiders”.
Figure 10 shows that the number and frequency of turnover events for low and high
ROA industries, and for each departure reason and replacement type. In low ROA
industries there are more instances of firings and unclassified departures (possible quits)
than in high ROA industries, and in such instances it is more likely that an outsider
will be brought in, relative to similar instances in high ROA industries. For instance,
in high ROA industries there were 122 instances were the incumbent was fired and in
36% of these cases, he was replaced by an outsider. In low ROA industries there were
185 firings, and 39% of these instances led to an outside hire. Similarly, in high ROA
industries there were 518 instances of possible quits, and 25% of these were followed by
an outside hire. In low ROA industries, there were 619 instances of possible quits, and
in 32% of these cases an outsider was brought in.
We interpret these patterns as evidence that the more likely it is that the incumbent
CEO-firm match is suboptimal, the more likely it is for the firm to bring in a replacement
CEO with a different background and expertise than a company insider. This evidence
is consistent with the finding documented by Allgood and Farrell (2003) that best firm-
CEO matches tend to occur when inside CEOs follow previous CEOs who quit, and when
outside CEOs follow previous CEOs who are dismissed.
To see whether these univariate results are robust, we estimate a multivariate probit
model for the likelihood that the replacement CEO is an outsider. We allow stock market
and real variables that describe firm and industry conditions to influence this likelihood,
as we did in our analysis of types of CEO departures in Table 5. The results of this
probit model are shown in Table 7.
35
Since we condition on there being turnover and then inquire what type of CEO is
hired, our analysis is different from that in Parrino (1997), where firm-specific perfor-
mance is used to predict what type of CEO is in place, and “no turnover” (i.e. the
incumbent is still CEO) is one of the possible outcomes. The results there indicate that
the likelihood of outside succession, relative to there being no turnover, is negatively
related to industry-adjusted stock returns and ROA. In other words, replacing a CEO,
and doing so with an outsider, happens when the firm is underperforming the industry.
Our evidence complements the result in Parrino (1997) and also shows that industry
conditions matter for the type of CEO hired. We argue that this is because of the effect
of such conditions on the desired management style or skill set.
The results in Table 7 show that the probability of a replacement by an outsider
relative to an insider is higher when the firm’s industry-adjusted stock return and ROA
are lower, a result very much in the spirit of that of Parrino (1997). We also find that a
succession by a company outsider is more likely relative to an inside succession when the
industry ROA is lower, and if the industry has experienced a lower growth in employment.
This pattern holds whether we measure employment using CRSP/Compustat figures that
refer to public companies only, or BEA figures that capture the overall employment in pri-
vate and public companies (reported using the NAIC industry classification). Therefore,
replacements by outsiders seem to be particularly common after poor firm and industry
performance, that is, at times when continuing the same strategy as before may not be
beneficial.
Figure 11 shows the dynamics of firm ROA performance relative to the industry for
all CEO departure reasons and replacement types, to illustrate that these different types
of turnover events happen to firms in different circumstances. To obtain the results in
this figure we calculate the average firm performance relative to the industry in terms
of ROA across all firm-year observations in years when turnover occured in those firms
(time 0), and also in the one year prior and one year after turnover (time -1 and time
1, respectively). Independent of the type of CEO departure, the firm’s ROA relative to
that of the industry is lower prior to the turnover event in cases where the new CEO
is a company outsider, relative to those where there is no replacement or the new CEO
is a company insider. The under-performance of firms under incumbent CEOs who are
eventually replaced by outsiders is greatest in instances when the incumbent is fired, and
smallest in instances when the incumbent’s departure is due to retirement. Overall, it
appears that outside CEOs are brought in to replace incumbents who are no longer a
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good match for the firm.
4.3 Compensation and CEO skills
The third main hypothesis we test, (H3), states that the pay of CEOs reflects the market
price of their skill bundles. As the model suggests, the pay offered to the new CEO
must compensate him for his forgone outside option. For an individual to decide to take
the CEO job at a firm that is performing poorly, or is in an industry going through
a downturn, he must receive higher compensation than the CEO of a less distressed
firm, as suggested by the example in section 2.2. We find evidence consistent with these
arguments, as shown in Figures 12 to 16 and the regression model in Table 8. The
quantities plotted in these figures are obtained by averaging CEO pay across all firm-
year observations for which a turnover event is recorded (time 0), as well as for the the
year before and the year after the CEO replacement (time -1 and time 1, respectively).
When an outsider is brought in, irrespective of the reason for departure of the prior
CEO, his total pay is higher than that of an insider replacement, a continuing CEO
or the prior CEO (Figure 12). Therefore, since pay does not decrease in the event of
a replacement by an outsider, such events must occur because the outsider’s ability or
quality of match is higher than that of the incumbent, and because the outsider has more
general human capital than the incumbent CEO that can be deployed in other firms or
industries.
The sizable increase in pay of the outsider relative to that of an insider replacement,
a continuing CEO or the prior CEO is driven mostly by the value of the option grants
given to the new CEO who is brought from outside the company (Figure 13) and less so
through bonuses (Figure 15) or other types of pay that exclude salary, bonus or option
grants (Figure 16). Salaries of outsider replacement CEOs are actually lower than those
received by CEOs in these three comparison categories (Figure 14). The highest pay is
received by new CEOs who come in after the prior CEO was fired, with outsiders getting
paid more than insiders. New CEOs from inside the company are paid a similar amount
as continuing CEOs at companies that do not experience turnover.
The regression models in Table 8 yield the same results as univariate findings in
Figures 12 through 16. Controlling for industry and year fixed-effects, as well as firm
market value, we find that the total pay of a new CEO is lowest if he is an insider
replacing a retired incumbent ($0.45 million less than the pay of a continuing CEO), and
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highest if he is a company outsider replacing a fired incumbent ($2.5 million more than
the pay of a continuing CEO). Irrespective of the departure reason (retirement, possible
quit, or forced out), the replacement CEO will earn total compensation equal or lower
than continuing CEOs if he is a company insider, but higher than continuing CEOs if he
is a company outsider.
5 Conclusion
We consider the link between industry conditions and the CEO labor market in the
context of a competitive assignment model where both the CEO and firm optimize over
the relative value of preserving the match versus pursuing their outside option. In contrast
to a principal-agent framework where only relative performance affects CEO turnover, in
a matching environment both firm and CEO characteristics as well as broader industry
conditions naturally drive turnover events. Although the competitive assignment model
has been used by several authors recently to explain empirical facts about CEO pay, we
are the first to show that such a model can also be used to successfully understand the
dynamics of CEO turnover.
We find empirical support for these ideas using a large dataset we construct describing
turnover events during the period 1992-2006. We collect information regarding both the
reason for the incumbent CEO’s departure and the identity and background of the new
CEO. This information allows us to ascertain with greater precision the reason behind the
turnover event. We study the effect of firm and industry conditions on the likelihood of
turnovers categorized as forced departures, quits or retirements. We similarly document
the determinants of the choice of whether the replacement CEO will be a firm insider or
outsider, and show that type and pay of the new CEO is related to the reason behind
the incumbent’s replacement. Our empirical findings generally match our theoretical
predictions and illustrate that a competitive assignment model can explain the patterns
in observed managerial turnover across industries and over time.
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Figure 5: Frequency of firings and industry conditions during 1993-2005.
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Figure 6: Frequency of unclassified departures and industry conditions during 1993-2005.
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Figure 7: Frequency of retirements and industry conditions during 1993-2005.
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Figure 8: Frequency of turnover types as a function of industry conditions, 1993-2005.
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Figure 10: Turnover events (number and frequency) by industry ROA.
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Figure 11: Firm relative to industry ROA dynamics around turnover year (time 0).
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Figure 12: Total pay dynamics around turnover year (time 0).
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Figure 13: Options value dynamics around turnover year (time 0).
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Figure 14: Salary dynamics around turnover year (time 0).
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Figure 15: Bonus dynamics around turnover year (time 0).
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Figure 16: Other pay dynamics around turnover year (time 0).
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Table 1: Firm skill weights and managerial skill levels for two firm example.
Time 0 Firm skill weights Time 1 Firm skill weights Managerial Skill Levels
θA θB θA θB aw ax ay az
3 0 3 0 1 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 2 1 0 0 1 3
Table 2: Equilibrium allocations at date 0 for two firm example.
w x y z
Firm A output 5 2 0 0
Firm A pay 1
2
+ 2ǫ
Firm A profits 41
2
− 2ǫ
Firm B output 1 1 0 0
Firm B pay 1
2
+ ǫ
Firm B profits 1
2
− ǫ
Table 3: Equilibrium allocations at date 1 for two firm example.
w x y z
Firm A output 3 0 2 6
Firm A pay 1
2
+ ǫ 0 1
2
+ ǫ 21
2
+ 2ǫ
Firm A profits 21
2
− ǫ 11
2
− ǫ 31
2
− 2ǫ
Firm B output 0 0 1 3
Firm B pay 1
2
+ ǫ 21
2
+ ǫ
Firm B profits 0 0 1
2
− ǫ 1
2
− ǫ
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Table 4: Multinomial logit model for CEO departure reasons. The reference category is “no turnover”. Exogenous
turnover indicates instances where the CEO left the company because of age or health reasons. Forced turnover indicates
instances where the CEO was forced out. Unclassified turnover refers to the CEO departures that were not exogenous,
nor forced. Standard errors are clustered by Fama French 48 industry codes. Fama French 48 industry codes fixed-effects
are included.
Panel A Panel B
exogenous unclassified forced exogenous unclassified forced
turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover
Firm− IndustryReturnt –0.35 –0.47 –2.02 –0.35 –0.47 –2.02
(–3.23)∗∗∗ (–4.92)∗∗∗ (–8.62)∗∗∗ (–3.23)∗∗∗ (–4.92)∗∗∗ (–8.62)∗∗∗
Industry −MarketReturnt –0.02 0.03 –1.23
(–0.10) (0.23) (–3.99)∗∗∗
VWMarketReturnt 0.29 –0.91 –0.66 0.31 –0.94 0.57
(1.16) (–4.02)∗∗∗ (–1.66)∗ (1.07) (–3.65)∗∗∗ (1.52)
Firm− IndustryReturnt−1 –0.15 –0.22 –0.82 –0.15 –0.22 –0.82
(–1.82)∗ (–2.89)∗∗∗ (–4.79)∗∗∗ (–1.82)∗ (–2.89)∗∗∗ (–4.79)∗∗∗
Industry −MarketReturnt−1 –0.40 0.03 –0.49
(–1.60) (0.11) (–1.86)∗
VWMarketReturnt−1 0.77 –0.20 0.86 1.18 –0.22 1.35
(4.00)∗∗∗ (–0.76) (2.62)∗∗∗ (3.93)∗∗∗ (–0.72) (4.50)∗∗∗
VWFFIndustryReturnt –0.02 0.03 –1.23
(–0.10) (0.23) (–3.99)∗∗∗
VWFFIndustryReturnt−1 –0.40 0.03 –0.49
(–1.60) (0.11) (–1.86)∗
IsUnder65t –1.85 –1.30 0.09 –1.85 –1.30 0.09
(–23.27)∗∗∗ (–13.34)∗∗∗ (0.40) (–23.27)∗∗∗ (–13.34)∗∗∗ (0.40)
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.071
No. of obs 19381 19381
Fama French 48 industry fixed effects included
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Table 5: Multinomial logit model for CEO departure reasons. The reference category is “no turnover”. Exogenous
turnover indicates instances where the CEO left the company because of age or health reasons. Forced turnover indicates
instances where the CEO was forced out. Unclassified turnover refers to the CEO departures that were not exogenous,
nor forced. Standard errors are clustered by Fama French 48 industry codes.
Panel A Panel B
exogenous unclassified forced exogenous unclassified forced
turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover
Firm− IndustryReturnt –0.32 –0.35 –1.87 –0.31 –0.35 –1.85
(–2.90)∗∗∗ (–3.86)∗∗∗ (–6.90)∗∗∗ (–2.86)∗∗∗ (–3.82)∗∗∗ (–6.76)∗∗∗
Industry −MarketReturnt 0.07 0.17 –1.10 0.05 0.16 –1.06
(0.30) (0.95) (–3.22)∗∗∗ (0.22) (0.92) (–3.26)∗∗∗
VWMarketReturnt 0.45 –0.48 –0.49 0.37 –0.48 –0.38
(1.42) (–2.01)∗∗ (–0.98) (1.31) (–2.29)∗∗ (–0.88)
Firm− IndustryReturnt−1 –0.14 –0.08 –0.73 –0.13 –0.09 –0.72
(–1.80)∗ (–1.16) (–4.62)∗∗∗ (–1.72)∗ (–1.17) (–4.57)∗∗∗
Industry −MarketReturnt−1 –0.29 0.20 –0.32 –0.34 0.21 –0.22
(–0.96) (0.74) (–0.85) (–1.19) (0.79) (–0.67)
VWMarketReturnt−1 0.99 0.18 0.81 0.80 0.16 0.84
(3.94)∗∗∗ (0.72) (2.01)∗∗ (3.24)∗∗∗ (0.61) (2.65)∗∗∗
Firm− IndustryROAt 0.02 –1.26 –1.89 –0.04 –1.27 –1.93
(0.04) (–4.39)∗∗∗ (–4.28)∗∗∗ (–0.08) (–4.35)∗∗∗ (–4.21)∗∗∗
IndustryROAt 0.85 –2.31 –0.95 0.84 –2.34 –1.48
(1.49) (–2.16)∗∗ (–0.73) (1.31) (–2.10)∗∗ (–1.32)
IndustryROABelowTrendt 0.08 0.23 0.29 0.08 0.23 0.26
(0.85) (3.62)∗∗∗ (2.18)∗∗ (0.94) (3.85)∗∗∗ (2.02)∗∗
Firm− IndustryEmploymentGrowtht –0.65 –0.69 –0.30
(–2.64)∗∗∗ (–3.40)∗∗∗ (–1.14)
IndustryEmploymentGrowtht –1.21 –0.63 1.97
(–1.37) (–0.85) (1.91)∗
Firm−NAICEmploymentGrowtht –0.69 –0.69 –0.28
(–2.82)∗∗∗ (–3.47)∗∗∗ (–1.05)
NAICEmploymentGrowtht 0.69 –0.43 5.18
(0.43) (–0.35) (3.15)∗∗∗
IsUnder65t –1.79 –1.27 0.09 –1.80 –1.28 0.09
(–21.50)∗∗∗ (–13.57)∗∗∗ (0.39) (–21.10)∗∗∗ (–13.71)∗∗∗ (0.39)
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.068
No. of obs 18804 18751
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Table 6: Multinomial logit model for CEO replacement types. The reference replacement
category is “company insider”. Fama French 48 industry code fixed effects are included.
Standard errors clustered by Fama French 48 industry code.
company outsider, industry outsider
industry insider from public co. from private firms
UnclassifiedDeparturet 0.37 0.32 0.34
(1.71)∗ (1.83)∗ (1.35)
ForcedDeparturet 0.79 0.89 0.50
(2.70)∗∗∗ (4.43)∗∗∗ (1.31)
Pseudo R2 0.073
No. of obs 2125
Fama French 48 industry fixed-effects included
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Table 7: Probit models for the likelihood that the replacement CEO is a company out-
sider. Reference category is “company insider”. Standard errors clustered by Fama
French 48 industry code.
Dependent variable Replacement is company outsider
Panel A Panel B
Firm− IndustryReturnt –0.32 –0.33
(–4.73)∗∗∗ (–4.68)∗∗∗
Industry −MarketReturnt –0.01 –0.02
(–0.07) (–0.09)
VWMarketReturnt 0.38 0.31
(1.89)∗ (1.65)∗
Firm− IndustryReturnt−1 –0.04 –0.04
(–0.67) (–0.66)
Industry −MarketReturnt−1 0.20 0.12
(1.58) (0.97)
VWMarketReturnt−1 0.04 0.04
(0.21) (0.19)
Firm− IndustryROAt –1.22 –1.21
(–5.12)∗∗∗ (–5.08)∗∗∗
IndustryROAt –2.52 –2.14
(–3.79)∗∗∗ (–2.88)∗∗∗
IndustryROABelowTrendt –0.06 –0.04
(–0.94) (–0.68)
Firm− IndustryEmploymentGrowtht 0.06
(0.58)
IndustryEmploymentGrowtht –1.20
(–2.23)∗∗
Firm−NAICEmploymentGrowtht 0.04
(0.37)
NAICEmploymentGrowtht –2.85
(–2.95)∗∗∗
IsUnder65t 0.18 0.18
(2.57)∗∗ (2.68)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.043
No. of obs 1933 1930
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Table 8: CEO compensation patterns. Reference event category is “no turnover at time
t”. All pay components are expressed in $ thousands. Fama French 48 industry code
fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Options Other Total
Salaryt+1 Bonust+1 V aluet+1 Payt+1 Payt+1
Retirementt, Insidert –61.80 –172.46 0.74 –216.56 –450.07
(–5.96)∗∗∗ (–3.69)∗∗∗ (0.00) (–2.28)∗∗ (–2.04)∗∗
Retirementt, Outsidert –91.61 114.06 785.94 607.01 1415.40
(–4.75)∗∗∗ (1.21) (2.13)∗∗ (2.32)∗∗ (2.72)∗∗∗
V oluntaryt, Insidert –99.83 –142.48 14.22 –123.37 –351.47
(–12.70)∗∗∗ (–4.06)∗∗∗ (0.11) (–1.60) (–2.14)∗∗
V oluntaryt, Outsidert –138.88 –153.38 1143.53 222.17 1073.44
(–10.35)∗∗∗ (–3.86)∗∗∗ (4.05)∗∗∗ (1.85)∗ (3.05)∗∗∗
Forcedt, Insidert –94.73 –139.98 225.48 41.86 32.62
(–4.46)∗∗∗ (–1.53) (0.58) (0.21) (0.08)
Forcedt, Outsidert –92.60 58.82 1969.56 556.05 2491.83
(–3.18)∗∗∗ (0.65) (3.52)∗∗∗ (2.44)∗∗ (3.84)∗∗∗
MarketV aluet 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.24
(16.85)∗∗∗ (12.00)∗∗∗ (14.50)∗∗∗ (11.49)∗∗∗ (19.08)∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.284 0.204 0.172 0.168 0.275
Observations 19336 19336 19336 19336 19336
Fama French 48 industry fixed effects, year fixed effects included
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